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This paper studies the politics of social policy development in postcolonial Hong Kong,
focusing on how societal mobilization has affected social policymaking in a liberal autocratic
and semi-democratic setting. The significance of social mobilization in affecting social policy
development has been receiving more scholarly attention. For instance, Kwon (2002, 2005)
has adopted the concept of advocacy coalitions to study the politics of health care reform in
Korea (Kwon, 2002) and comparative social policy reform in Korea and Taiwan (2005), paying
particular attention to the collaboration between actors across the state and nonstate
institutions. Hsiao’s (2001) study of the social welfare movement in Taiwan has also shown
how the structure of civil society and the linkages of important societal actors may have a
direct impact on social policy development.
 Joseph Wong’s (2004) comparative study of health care reform in Taiwan and South
Korea from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s represents by far the most systematic effort at
elucidating the causal mechanisms between democratization and social policy development.
Through his comparative studies, Wong generalizes some theoretical relationships between
democratization and social policy change in Asian late democratizers. Among his major
findings are that:
1) the logic of political competition compels newly democratic regimes to initiate some social
policy reform as a way to secure continuous popular support.
2) institutionalized political competition prompts strategic political actors to turn socio-
economic issues into salient bases of political contestation. Civil society actors will also take
advantage of this ideological and issue space and push social policy reform agendas from the
bottom up.
3) with democratization the state’s social policy networks become increasingly open to
outside political influence. It opens up new channels for the participation of previously
marginal actors in the policy process, and brings about policy learning among officials as well
as political learning among elected politicians.
4) cross-class coalition building is necessary for social welfare reform. These cross-class
coalitions galvanized disparate groups around a single policy issue, fostered societal
consensus on social policy reform, and framed the idea of social welfare reform in the
language of democratic citizenship. They also formed effective linkages with reform minded
politicians and legislators, turning their policy ideas into effective political influence. Their
inclusion of policy experts enabled them to articulate sophisticated policy alternatives to
counter the policy discourse produced by the state. (Wong 2004, ch.8)
Wong’s (2004) theoretical findings provide extremely useful perspectives and
reference points for us to study the impact of social mobilization in the semi-democratic
setting. While for Hong Kong democratization is arrested and to date it remains a semi-
democracy, civil liberties have been present since the late colonial period and remain well-
protected after the handover of sovereignty.  Under this liberal autocratic setting, on the one
hand, the absence of popular elections as a mechanism for choosing the government means
that state actors are not under the uncertainty of losing their official positions in electoral
competition and are thus not strongly compelled to be responsive to popular demands when
making public policy. As a result, the state’s inherent approach to social policymaking remains
well-entrenched. The state’s policy networks remain exclusive and relatively impervious to
outside influence. On the other hand, electoral competition, though limited, creates incentives
for legislators to attack the government’s policy failures and shortcomings as a way of gaining
popularity. Opposition parties and even pro-establishment parties are compelled to
collaborate with civil society as a way to pressurize the government to make policy changes.
Even though the chief executive is elected by an Election Committee of 800 electors, most of
whom belong to the pro-establishment camp, more and more the Election Committee has
become an avenue for sectoral interests to make demands on the “candidate” in exchange for
their votes. In 2007, the success of the opposition camp in nominating a second candidate to
run for the election also put extra pressure on the chief executive candidate handpicked by
the Chinese government to be responsive to popular demands, essentially bringing important
social policy issues onto the public agenda and compelling the chief executive “designate” to
make certain electoral promises. Thus even though state leaders are not faced with the
“uncertainty” of election, their reliance on the support of sectoral interests and good policy
performance as a source of legitimacy means they have to respond to societal demand.
In this sense, the collaboration of civil society groups, opposition parties and
politicians may generate societal mobilization strong enough to pressurize the state to make
policy change. The findings of this paper will show that compared with Asian liberal
democracies, there is much less room for collaboration between the state and societal actors.
Mobilization has to be much more confrontational in order for it to have policy impact. Under
the semi-democratic setting, social mobilization may make an impact on the state through
highly contentious activities rather than through building broad consensus, shaping social
citizenship, and constructing alternative policy discourse. Likewise, state actors may make
concessions out of political pressure rather than fundamental change in official position or
policy learning. As a result social policy change tends to be disjointed and incremental. Lastly,
while Hong Kong has a longer history of civil liberty than South Korea and Taiwan, it has not
experienced the strong exogenous shock brought about by the democratic movement in the
latter two countries. Thus while there is robust civil society activities in Hong Kong, the civil
society is actually not as strongly organized. Such weak organization is witnessed in social
mobilization, which entails coalition of a smaller scale.
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